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Abstract 
 
This is a prepublication version of an analysis of stagnation and divergence  in the 
world economy which appeared in Pettifor, A (2003) Real World Economic Outlook, pp152-
159. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp152-164. A fuller version of this same paper was 
presented to the British International Studies Association conference in September 2002. 
It uses data published by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook team to establish that world 
GDP per head, calculated in constant 1995 dollars at current market exchange, 
remained static between 1980 and 2002 and declined absolutely between 1988 and 
2002.  
Over the same period – ‘globalisation’, understood as the period of intense financial 
deregulation and the creation of a world market in capital – this article uses the same 
figures to prove that the income gap between the North and the South has doubled. 
Inequality is measured as the ratio between GDP per capita in the IMF’s ‘Advanced 
countries’ and all remaining countries, in current dollars at market exchange rates.  
At the beginning of globalisation this ratio was approximately 10 to 1. By 2002 it was 
nearly 23 to 1.  Over this period the real average GDP per capita of the ‘non-advanced 
countries’ comprising four-fifths of the world’s population, has fallen absolutely, from 
$1400 to $1100 per year. 
This economic failure, the article argues, is the underlying cause of the political 
instability that characterises the current period. The most basic problem of the world 
economy has not been solved – the imbalance between the declining relative 
productivity of the USA and its commercial and military dominance.  
The result is predicted to be a unstable period of history as these contradictions work 
their way through into the political sphere. 
‘Globalisation: the end of an era’, in Pettifor, A (2003) Real World Economic Outlook, pp152-
159. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp152-164. 
Later version of: ‘The New world order and the failure of globalisation’ annual conference of 
the British International Studies Association, London School of Economics, December 17th 
2002 
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World GDP and GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars, converted from national currencies at current 
exchange rates. 
Source: World Economic Outlook April 2003 database, University of Groningen Growth Project 
Figure 1.1 
In 1988, the GDP of the world in dollars was $4,839. In 2002, it was 
$4,748.  These figures, like all others in this article, were extracted from GDP 
data published by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook database, with data 
before 1992 on the countries in transition from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre, and population data from the US Bureau of the Census. 
These rates are in constant 1995 dollars at current (period average) market 
exchange rates.They thus measure the income of the world in terms of its 
power to purchase global products – specifically those of the USA – unlike 
published figures which are generally expressed in terms such as Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) dollars, which reflect purchasing power in local markets. 
This measure provides a great deal more insight into the underlying 
processes which led both to the Iraq war, and to the increasingly protectionist 
rhetoric and practice of the advanced powers. 
Conventional economic wisdom holds that globalization was an economic 
success, and that its main problems arise from political opposition. It would be 
closer to the mark to say that globalization was a political triumph but an 
economic catastrophe.  
The years 1980-2000 were the closest to a world free market that the 
twentieth century saw, under a single world economic policy, which has 
regulated world trade – above all trade in capital – with few dissenters and even 
fewer exceptions.  Critics of this policy are widely mythologized as idealistic, 
utopian, and standing in the way of progress. A closer examination suggests the 
critics were perhaps more realistic than the policy-makers.  
   
It suggests also that the new world politics have their origin not in an 
irrational overturn of previously sound policies but in the very same economic 
failure. The economic consequences of globalization go beyond mere 
regression. It has rendered large tracts of the world ungovernable, thrown many 
advanced nations into chronic slow growth and divided them between 
themselves, leading to the conflicts that finally surfaced in the profound 
divisions surrounding the war on Iraq. 
The process has thus run into political obstacles that include not just a 
dismissible army of protestors but less surmountable, and more endemic 
difficulties:  war, a new bipolarity, a return to protectionism and a colonial 
agenda. The roots of this political process lie, not in some recidivist reaction 
against globalisation, but deep within the process itself and above all, from its 
economic failures. 
Stagnation and divergence: shaping a new political geography 
The absolute growth rate of the world economy has been falling systematically 
as chart 2 has already shown. Table 1.1 summarizes the outcome.  
 
 World GDP World GDP per capita 
1970-80 
1980-90 
1990-00 
5.51% 
2.27% 
1.09% 
3.76% 
0.69% 
-0.19% 
 
Table 1.1 World GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars 
 
But in parallel with this, the world is diverging as Figure 1.3 shows. From 
1984 the industrialised and ‘other advanced’ countries pulled away from the rest 
of the world. In the 1990s per capita GDP in the countries in transition fell 
between 50 per cent and 75 per cent depending on the measure adopted, 
catapulting them into the ranks of the developing countries.  In a further 
development, during the 1990s the Major Industrial Countries (the G7) pulled 
away from the other advanced economies, comprising basically the South-East 
Asian Newly-Industrialised Countries (NICs) 
As Figure1.2 shows, this differential growth did not speed up the growth of 
the advanced countries relative to the rest of the world. It slowed down the 
growth of the rest of the world, relative to the advanced countries. 
In terms of world political geography this has decisive consequences and 
marks a sharp change compared with the ‘Golden Age’ and even the 1970s. In 
periods when world output as a whole was rising, the continued relative 
divergence of rich from poor countries did not produce mass impoverishment on 
the scale now being seen. Divergence appeared largely as ‘differential rates of 
growth’ and thus, in some sense, the great majority of the world was getting 
better off. Divergence combined with stagnation has a completely opposite 
effect; the countries at the bottom of the pile suffer the combined effect of 
getting poorer relative to the average, at the same time that the average is 
declining. Absolute impoverishment is back. 
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Figure 1.2 Stagnation plus divergence 
Thus in 1980, 118 million people lived in nine countries where GDP per 
head declined absolutely over the previous decade. In 1998, there were 60 
such countries and 1.3 billion such people. Impoverishment on such a scale is 
politically unsustainable; it is the basic driver behind the collapse of the world 
bloc which drove through the financial policies of the 1980s. 
The measure of growth 
These judgements depend on the measure adopted. World GDP, 
measured in dollars, rises and falls with exchange rates. Does the dollar, as unit 
of measurement, not merely report its fortunes on the FOREX markets, rather 
than offering a real indicator of growth? 
Measures such as PPP dollars, in which the world financial institutions 
report world output, are adjusted to reflect the local cost of living. Since costs 
are generally lower in poorer countries, these provide higher estimates of the 
income of poor people. 
The problem is that in order to grow and prosper, a country requires not 
cheap local produce but access to technologically-advanced products and 
services, whose use and production are concentrated in the rich countries. By 
assessing output in real dollars, we obtain a more accurate measure of the true 
cost of development, namely the cost of obtaining advanced country products. It 
should not be forgotten, moreover, that securing access to world products was 
one of the main arguments advanced to persuade the political elites of the poor 
countries to open their doors to world markets. 
Actually, the very fact that exchange rate GDP is diverging from PPP GDP 
signifies that something new is going on. Thirty years ago world output was 
rising unambiguously, and now it is not; the most definite statement that can be 
made, by anyone who wishes to argue that world output is still rising, is that this 
view is supported only if one measures output in one particular way. 
   
 
It is hard to sustain the argument that real dollar GDP understates long-
term growth, or that the fall in output reported above is a consequence of 
foreign exchange effects alone.  It is true that when the dollar appreciates 
against other currencies, then the output of other countries measured in dollars 
will ceteris paribus fall. But over the whole of the period in which world output 
has fallen, the dollar has not appreciated against any major currency by more 
than 18 per cent – little more than 1 per cent per year – and it has by no means 
appreciated against all leading currencies. If, for example, growth is measured 
in Yen, the result is an even more decisive decline in world GDP, as Table 1.3 
demonstrates. 
 
 
World GDP World GDP per capita 
1970-80 
1980-90 
1990-00 
47.11% 
31.54% 
-6.45% 
44.60% 
29.34% 
-7.63% 
 
Table 1.3 Annual growth of world GDP per capita in Yen 
 
To say the least, if IMF and World Bank reports were drawn up in Yen there 
would be some explaining to do. 
No matter how rosy the picture displayed in a succession of World Bank 
reports in terms of PPP dollars, there has been no suggestion that countries 
might settle their debts in PPP dollars – a step that would reduce debt 
payments for many third world countries by 75 per cent and more. If PPP 
dollars really do measure wealth, why not use them as means of payment or at 
least settlement? 
PPPs compare living standards in national economies independent of 
currency variations. They are fictitious exchanges rates that take account of 
local national costs. Where these are low, the PPP exchange rate is higher than 
the actual market rate. Thus the GDP of India measured in 1996 PPPs was 
$1,783 billion but in dollars $441.7 billion, because in India a dollar buys, it is 
calculated, 1,783/441.7 = 4 times as much as in the USA. 
This offers a key insight in relation to the increasingly strident and open 
argument between world development agencies such as UNCTAD and the 
international financial institutions. UNCTAD shares an analytical consensus to 
measure output in PPPs, which stretches across world institutions and many 
NGOs. The point is thus that even in PPPs a genocidal decline in purchasing 
power of the poorest third of the world’s population is incontrovertible. The 
underlying trends are so stark that they impose themselves on any measure. In 
PPPs, UNCTAD in 2002 reported that in the 39 Least-Developed Countries 
(LDCs) at the end of the 1960s 211 million people were living on an income of 
less than $2 per day in PPPs. By the end of the 1990s there were 448 million, 
an increase of over 100 per cent. 
This is the key to Table 21 from the UNCTAD report on LDC poverty, 
reproduced here as Table 1.2  
   
 
 
1965–69 1975–79 1985–189 1995–99 
Population living on less than $2 a day (%)     
39 LDCs 80.8 82.1 81.9 80.7 
Of which: African LDCs 82.0 83.7 87.0 87.5 
Of which: Asian LDCs 78.8 79.6 73.4 68.2 
22 other developing countries 82.8 76.5 61.6 35.3 
     
Number of people living on less than $2 a day (millions)     
39 LDCs 211.1 277.5 360.5 449.3 
Of which: African LDCs 131.7 174.4 239.5 315.1 
Of which: Asian LDCs 79.1 102.9 120.3 133.3 
22 other developing countries 1,405.0 1,639.7 1,599.0 1,084.2 
Total 1,615.8 1,917 1,958.8 1,532.6 
 
Average daily consumption of those living below $2 a day (1985 PPP $) 
39 LDCs 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.03 
African LDCs 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.86 
Asian LDCs 1.27 1.27 1.37 1.42 
22 other developing countries 1.17 1.30 1.53 1.65 
Source: Karshenas, UNCTAD report on LDC poverty 2002 
Table 1.2  Poverty trends in LDCs and other developing countries, 1965–1999 1985 
PPP $2-a-day international poverty line 
 
Nevertheless these measures obscure the underlying dynamics, above all 
in world output, which are probably a great deal worse. The principal cause of 
divergence between the two measures of world output, aside from the general 
tendency of PPPs to exaggerate poor country output, are the specific effects of 
China and India. These two enormous Asian countries are in a special relation 
to the world market by sheer virtue of their size and hence the extent of their 
internal market. 
Moreover China is a very specific case which is singled out precisely by 
the fact that, unlike the USSR, it did not follow IMF prescriptions, has not 
transformed itself into a model IMF economy, and has an entirely different 
ownership structure in which over two-thirds of its production remains outside 
the private market in capital. There is no room for doubt that China has 
undergone a prodigious, and in terms of world history, highly exceptional phase 
of growth. This can hardly, however, be attributed to globalization; the whole 
point is that the role of the Chinese state has indeed dominated over market 
and global processes. If, therefore, one wishes to assess the impact of the 
market and of global processes as such, exception should be made of China. 
During the last two decades, the proportions in which China and India 
contribute to world real GDP according to the PPP measure have more than 
doubled and they are now counted at four times the worth that their product 
fetches on the world market. Measured peak to peak, if GDP is presented 
including India and China its growth rate shows no decline between 1979 and 
1985 and falls by only 0.5 per cent from the 1979 to the 1996 peak. Without 
China and India growth nearly halves over the latter period, from 5.3 per cent to 
3.3 per cent. 
This exception proves the rule. The global decline in world GDP is 
understated in PPPs only because of the specific situation of the two largest 
   
countries in the world; that is, it is the exception to globalisation and not the 
impact of globalisation that offsets its general impact on world poverty; second, 
in all those countries that do not enjoy the very particular advantages of China 
and India, the trend to poverty and differentiation is accelerated. 
The globalization of divergence 
Impoverishment is only one aspect of a more extended process of 
differentiation which is not confined to the impoverishment of a relative ‘minority’ 
of the world’s people in the LDCs. It is this differentiation, rendering the 
globalised world less and less homogenous, which is dissolving the 
globalisation bloc, literally tearing it apart. The impoverishment of the third world 
was accompanied by 
(1) at the end of the millennium, a significant deterioration following the 
‘Asian’ crisis in the condition of even that small group of developing 
countries such as the NICs that had been catching up with the advanced 
nations in the preceding thirty years 
(2) the outbreak of increasingly hostile competition even among the 
advanced countries, leading to significant deterioration in the Japanese 
and European economies, relative to the United States 
Between 1980 and 2000 the relation between the advanced or advancing 
countries as a whole (comprising here North America, the EuroZone, Japan and 
the advanced South-East Asian countries) and the rest of the world went 
through a qualitative evolution. GDP per capita of the rich nearly doubled; that 
of the rest of the world fell by around 30 per cent -- more, from its 1980 peak of 
$1,683 to its 1999 trough of $1,116. 
 1982 2000 
Rest of the World 
Advanced or advancing countries 
1,457 
15,383 
1,116 
26,134 
 
Table 1.4 GDP per capita in 1995 dollars 
It should further be noted that this divergence is less affected by currency 
fluctuations in that it would be the same whether measured in dollars, Yen, 
pounds or Euros. Only if the output of each region is measured in a different 
unit, masking their differentiation, does the divergence appear to be reduced. 
Differentiation has proceeded at every level of the world economy. Most 
significantly, within the advanced and advancing countries a wholly new 
development took place in the 1990s. The US took the lead in growth, not by 
raising its own contribution to the growth of the world’s wealth but by reducing 
everyone else’s. US growth became, for the rest of the world, synonymous with 
its own stagnation. 
 Growth 1980-90 Growth 1990-2000 
Southeast Asia 
EuroZone 
North America 
68.4% 
25.2% 
24.8% 
19.5% 
-8.4% 
21.2% 
 
Table 1.5 Growth rates in the advanced countries 
 
   
This type of world growth is the opposite of that which took place during 
the ‘golden age’ of the late 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. In this phase, not 
only did the United States manifest qualitatively higher growth rates; it took the 
rest of the world with it.  The United States was in surplus. It was the most 
productive country in the world, at one and the same time the most 
technologically advanced, the richest, the greatest capital exporter, and the 
military and financial guarantor of the rest of the advanced world. Its military and 
financial dominance was in balance with its productive dominance.  
This situation has reversed. The last quarter of the century is dominated 
by the relative decline of the United States and its inability to hegemonize the 
rest of the world by raising its productive capacity. Instead, the United States is 
ever more insistently driven, by an inevitably economic logic, to use its military 
and financial weight to offset its productive weakness, manifested most starkly 
in its ineradicable trade deficit but also in the brutal facts of a world being torn 
apart by the United States’ fundamental economic incapacity to bring that world 
forward. 
 
